Who Was Selling

7 October 2026. Filings, market statistics and figures are as of the dates stated in the text.

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Renaissance Capital counts three sizable US IPOs that were postponed before pricing in the third quarter, all within a few weeks of each other in September: Oura, Holtec Nuclear and Bamboo Insurance. Postponements are usually read as a verdict on the market. On our reading, the more useful thing to look at is who was selling.

The Three Deals

• Holtec Nuclear: 50 million shares offered at $15 to $18, all of them sold by the company and none by existing holders. Profitable on its filing, with consolidated net income of $386.6 million in 2025. Asked the SEC on 25 September to withdraw its registration.
• Bamboo Insurance: 35 million shares offered at $18 to $20, none sold by the company and all 35 million by existing holders. Profitable on its reported results, with net income of $13.8 million in the first half of 2026; the filing's pro forma figures show a net loss. Postponed.
• Oura: 50 million shares offered at $40 to $44, of which 13.5 million were to be sold by the company and 36.5 million by existing holders. Profitable on its filing, with net income of $60.8 million in the nine months to June 2026. Postponed on 29 September.

As of 7 October, neither Bamboo nor Oura had filed to withdraw.

What the Seller Column Shows

Most of Oura's offering was a sale by existing holders, and the company's own share of the proceeds was largely spoken for. At the $42 midpoint Oura expected net proceeds of about $532.6 million, and its filing says it planned to use about $526.4 million of that to cover tax withholding on the net settlement of employee restricted stock units. The largest seller, Forerunner Ventures, which led Oura's Series B, was offering its entire remaining stake. Oura said it was postponing "despite strong demand, due to uncertainty in the IPO market", and its chief executive said "we have the luxury of choosing our moment."

Holtec's deal ran the other way. Every share was new, and the filing says the proceeds would pass to Holtec International for general corporate purposes, which may include accelerating the licensing, deployment and manufacturing of its SMR-300. Its withdrawal request told the SEC that it "no longer wishes to conduct a public offering of securities at this time".

Bamboo's offering was entirely secondary. The company would have received nothing from it, because every share was being sold by existing shareholders.

The seller column therefore shows whose decision each postponement was: the company's at Holtec, the holders' at Bamboo, and mostly the holders' at Oura. It cannot show who could afford to wait, since on their reported results all three were profitable and all three could. Nor does it show why they waited. None of the three gave price as its reason, and Oura said demand was strong. Renaissance supplies reasons of its own for two of them: Holtec shelved its offering "amid a struggling nuclear sector", and Bamboo postponed "after insurance peer Orion180 performed poorly in its debut".

Our reading is that the common thread is price, as the aftermarket sets it. On Renaissance's account, two of the three were looking at a sector or a peer that had traded badly after listing, and Oura pointed to uncertainty in the IPO market itself. On 27 July, writing under his own byline, Chan Ahn put the distinction this way: "Demand for an allocation is not the same thing as demand for the stock." September looks like sellers testing the second before relying on the first.

The Window Is Open, and Narrow

Renaissance Capital counts 112 US IPOs with a market value of at least $50 million priced this year, raising $147.5 billion as of 6 October. That is 31.3% fewer deals than at the same point last year, and 375.6% more in proceeds. Two of those deals were SpaceX, at $75 billion as Renaissance counts it, and SK hynix, at $26.5 billion. On our arithmetic from Renaissance's figures, the other 110 raised about $46 billion in a little over nine months. That already exceeds the $44.0 billion raised by 202 IPOs in the whole of 2025, from far fewer deals. Chan Ahn's July piece cited a different count, ICR's, which put the first half at about $46 billion excluding SpaceX. The two firms count differently, and the figures are not comparable.

The market is not shut. Two issuers set the totals, and behind them fewer, larger deals are getting done. In July Chan Ahn wrote that concentration, not sentiment, was always the thing to watch, and he still thinks so.

Which Side of the Deal the Buyer Is On

Forerunner led Oura's Series B in the company's 2020 fiscal year at a weighted-average $0.77 per preferred share, and each of those preferred shares converts into two common shares. The IPO range was $40 to $44 per common share.

A listing is how early holders realize a gap of that kind at scale, though it is not the only route. In February, according to the same filing, Oura itself bought back part of Forerunner's Series B stake at $40.18 per preferred share, each of which converts into two common shares, $65.0 million in all. Holders with that alternative are under no pressure to accept a price they do not like. The July piece made the same point: "A private company with access to secondary liquidity and continuation capital has no forcing function to go public."

For holders selling into an IPO, the offering is an exit, and two of September's three deals were mostly exits. If deals like these come back, a buyer's first question is who is selling, where the seller is not the company itself, and at what price that seller bought. Whether the company is good comes after.

This piece makes no case against buying in an IPO, and it is not a forecast. Its case is narrower: read the seller column first.

Sources: Holtec Nuclear Corporation, amended Form S-1, 8 September 2026, and request for withdrawal (Form RW), 25 September 2026; Holtec's net income figure is Holtec International's consolidated net income. Bamboo Insurance Services, Inc., amended Form S-1, 14 September 2026. Oura Inc., amended Form S-1, 21 September 2026, for the offering, the proceeds and their use, net income, the Series B and preferred conversion, the February 2026 repurchase from Forerunner, and the selling-stockholder table. Holtec's and Bamboo's amended S-1s also for net income, and Holtec's for its use of proceeds. Filings read from SEC EDGAR, 29 September 2026; filing lists re-checked 7 October 2026. Oura, "Oura Postpones Initial Public Offering", Business Wire, 29 September 2026. Renaissance Capital, US IPO market statistics and largest US IPOs, as of 6 October 2026 (IPOs of at least $50 million market cap), and US IPO Market 3Q 2026 Quarterly Review, 1 October 2026, for the three sizable postponements, Bamboo's postponement and the reasons it gives for Holtec and Bamboo. Chan Ahn's article of 27 July 2026, "Record on the Headline, Thin Underneath", as published under his byline, for the passages quoted and the ICR figure. Figures are as of the dates given.

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